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pAbstract
The period 2003–2007 was a period of economic and political changes for Ukraine.
In 2005, following the Orange Revolution, the new government engaged in a series
of economic reforms, among which was strengthening the legislation aimed at
encouraging gender equality in the labor market. Using data from the Ukrainian
Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (ULMS) I explore the impact of these economic and
political changes on the gender wage gap. Policies for gender equality seem to be
responsible for at least part of the reduction of the wage gap among the workers of
the public sector, both through the reduction in the differences between the
remuneration of observable characteristics for men and women and through the
reduction in horizontal and vertical segregation. On the other hand, the impact of
these policies among workers of the private sector (and especially among the
informally employed) seems much smaller, especially as far as the impact on
horizontal and vertical segregation is concerned.
This study utilizes the ULMS data set, a project initiated within the IZA-program
“Labor Markets in Emerging and Transition Economies”. The project is financially
supported by a consortium led by IZA, Bonn. The other permanent members of the
consortium are CERT, Heriot-Watt University Edinburgh, EERC-Ukraine and RWI-Essen.
Any opinions expressed here are those of the author and not those of ISET,
University of Bologna or IZA institute.1. Introduction
Two decades after the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the beginning of transition,
Ukraine is still a changing country. The Orange revolution (November 2004-January
2005), marked a big turning point in Ukrainian history. Following it, several reforms
were implemented, accelerating Ukraine’s movement out of its transition period and
significantly changing the environment in which economic agents operate. A number
of acts of the new government concerned labor market legislation, with a particular
emphasis on gender equality. This was a sign of change and an important step in
defense of one of the most vulnerable and disadvantaged groups of Ukrainian society
in line with the international commitments subscribed by previous governments.1
In their 2005 study of the gender gap in Ukraine, Ganguli and Terrell welcomed this
renewed interest towards gender equality and analyzed the evolution of the gender
wage gaps from 1986 (with communism) to 2003 in order to evaluate the distance of
Ukraine from the European benchmarks of gender equality in the labor markets. They
found that the mean gender gap in Ukraine - corrected for differences in the hours of2012 Pignatti; licensee Springer. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution
icense (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium,
rovided the original work is properly cited.
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public sector. (Pignatti 2011), analyzing 2003–2004 data, found that patterns of gender
wage gaps in the formal and informal sectors of the economy differed, with the gender
wage gap remaining largely unexplained in the formal sector and almost fully explained
by individual and job characteristics in the informal one.
Since 2005 several decrees and laws on gender equality have been passed, adding to
the already existing provisions contained in the Constitution and Labor Code of
Ukraine.3 The increased efforts to promote gender equality and to address gender
based discrimination have coincided with Ukrainian efforts to speed up the process of
integration into the global community and the achievement of the Millennium Devel-
opment Goal on gender equality. In a 2010 document published by ILO, Olga Kupets
lists the progress achieved (for example a decreasing trend characterizing the official
measures of the gender wage gap) but also stresses the need for their consolidation and
for a renewed effort to define a long-term modernization strategy for the labor market
incorporating the principles of gender equality.
In 2010, however, the Ukrainian political scene saw new significant changes4 which
are already affecting – and will increasingly affect – the development of the Ukrainian
labor market. Sticking to the area of gender equality, the Ministry for Family, Youth
and Sports, previously responsible for the implementation of the State Programme for
Ensuring Gender Equality in Ukrainian Society up to 2010, has been transformed into
the State Service of Youth and Sports, and no longer deals with gender policy. This
move has raised concern among national experts on gender policy and international
organizations.
The main goal of this paper is to study the evolution of the gender wage gap in the
Ukrainian labor market in a period (2003–2007) characterized by the introduction of
new regulations and institutions explicitly designed to promote gender equality.
The analysis will move along several different dimensions. Starting from the aggre-
gate level and from the identification of the raw wage gap, I will delve deeper into the
analysis, looking at determinants of the wage gap across the wage distribution and
across different sectors of the economy (private/public, formal/informal). I will ask
to what extent the measured wage gaps depend on a different remuneration of
characteristics (interpreted as an indication of discrimination) or on different
endowments. I will also look for evidence in favor or against the persistence of “glass
ceilings” and “sticky floors” for women’s wages in Ukraine and will try to see whether
results are common across different sectors of the labor market. This part of the
analysis is particularly interesting as the same aggregate outcomes can hide very
different underlying dynamics and patterns in different sectors of the economy.
As a final step, I will decompose the changes in the wage gap in the period 2003–2007,
looking at what is due to a change in the composition of the labor force (considering not
only human capital but also job characteristics) and what is instead due to differences in
returns for men and women.
The paper starts with a brief literature review followed by a short description of the
main events and trends characterizing Ukraine’s history in the period 2003–2007. In
section 4 I will introduce the dataset used and in section 5 the main methodologies
used in this paper. In section 6 I will present the results and proceed to the analysis.
Section 7 is the conclusion.
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The evolution of the gender wage gap during the transition from a planned economy to a
market-based economy has been subject of intense study over the last 15 years. This has
been due to at least two reasons. First of all, whenever there is a period of big changes the
most vulnerable segments of the population are exposed to a significantly larger risk of
falling into a state of poverty and deprivation. As women have long been identified as one
of the most vulnerable groups in the labor markets,5 studying and understanding the dy-
namics of the gender wage gap was therefore a crucial step in order to design more effect-
ive social policies. Secondly, the regime shifts taking place in transition countries could be
seen as a quasi-natural experiment allowing researchers to shed light on the true impact of
such an epochal change on the relative position of men and women in the labor market.
Theoretically the effect of the transition process on the gender wage gap was uncertain.
If it was true that in most planned economies (and certainly Soviet Union) participation
of women in the labor market was higher than in the west and with wage gaps relatively
lower (Newell and Reilly 2001), it was also true that several studies had showed gender
segregation existed both at a horizontal and a vertical level and women’s wages were
mostly concentrated in the lower part of the wage distribution (Brainerd 2000; Newell
and Reilly 2001). Given these initial conditions, the simultaneous freeing of competitive
market forces and the reduction in the role of the state could lead both to an increase in
the gender wage gap or to its reduction depending on the relative strength of the forces at
work, the institutional arrangements adopted by the new policy makers in power (such as
laws and regulations promoting gender equality or an increase in minimum wages) and
the labor market choices of men and women in the new economic environment. The em-
pirical studies conducted since the second part of the 1990s confirmed this expectation.
Among the forces expected to increase the gender wage gap was certainly the increase in
the wage dispersion associated with the reduced support of the state to “vulnerable categor-
ies”. The increase in wage dispersion has been a worldwide phenomenon that has
characterized the last decades, but is even more evident in the case of transition countries.
More uncertain was the expected effect of the changes in managers’ incentive structures
and their greater freedom to remunerate higher productivity workers differently, resulting in
an increased competition for the best workers that could raise – and indeed raised in most
cases - the remuneration of individual characteristics. Other factors potentially affecting the
gender wage gap during transition were the decrease in female segregation in low paid jobs6
and the exit of low earners (most of which were women) from the labor market.7
It is interesting to note how the interaction among these effects led to very different
final outcomes in different countries. For example, studying a sample of Former Soviet
Union (FSU) and Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries and comparing the
gender wage gap in those countries a few years before and after the beginning of transi-
tion, (Brainerd 2000) was able to identify two very distinct patterns. While in Russia
and Ukraine the gender wage gap increased, both at the mean and at the median, in
CEE countries it decreased. Brainerd explained these two different patterns with differ-
ent evolutions in the labor markets8:
– the stronger widening in the wage distribution associated with the pervasiveness of
wage arrears, and nominal wage rigidity (including minimum wage rigidity) in
presence of high inflation in the FSU countries;
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observed skills (higher for women) in CEE countries.
Results for China also fit in this picture, although the contribution of the increase in
the remuneration of observed skills to the evolution of the gender wage gap looks
reversed. (Liu, Meng and Zhang 2000) report an increase in the gender wage gap
associated with a decreasing relative importance of its unexplained component over the
period under study. This is because – contrary to the situation in Soviet Union and in
Central and Eastern Europe – in the period under study Chinese men had a relatively
higher level of observable skills.
Later studies, with longer time spans, better datasets and - in most cases - more
advanced econometric techniques, confirmed the importance of the channels identified
by the earlier literature and most of the previous findings, with some factors losing
importance while others gained it.
Ukraine is a very good example of how the situation in a country can evolve with the
passage of time. Here the initial pattern identified by Brainerd does not seem to continue
when the time horizon is extended. (Ganguli and Terrell 2005), using the Ukrainian
Longitudinal Monitoring Survey dataset covering the years from 1986 to 2003, found
that while the gap had been slightly increasing from the pre-transition period to the
beginning of transition, it diminished below the initial point after one decade. This
reduction showed that also in Ukraine the transition process and the series of eco-
nomic and political changes that characterized it had helped reducing the gender gap.
The analysis of Ganguli and Terrell is also important as it extended beyond the mean
gap to analyze changes across all the distribution, estimating a number of counterfac-
tual scenarios. The picture that emerged was of a country in which the average gap was
decreasing in later years, mostly due to changes in the lower end of the wage distribu-
tion. Ganguli and Terrell suggested as a possible explanation of this phenomenon the
increasing importance of minimum wages (exactly the opposite of what was observed
in the first years of transition) raising the “floor” for women at the same time as the
rewards for men in the lower part of the distribution deteriorated. In the higher half of
the wage distribution, instead, the “ceiling” to women’s earnings appeared to be quite
persistent. Surprisingly enough, the mean gap was found to be larger in the public
sector, with the glass ceiling there being lower (making the gap higher). Even though
this seemed to be partially explained by a more favorable distribution of men’s skills in
the public sector, compared to the one observed in the private one, Ganguli and Terrell
concluded that the path towards greater gender equality in Ukraine would have
required a greater commitment to gender equality by the government, not only through
legislation, but also directly, by increasingly behaving as a gender equal employer.
But how likely are government efforts to increase gender equality to be successful?
Evidence from empirical studies seems to indeed suggest that introducing gender-
equalizing policies can, in some instances, help reduce the gender wage gap. For
example, (Jolliffe and Campos 2005) found a steady reduction in the gender wage gap
in Hungary during the period 1986–1998. In this case, the authors stress the role of the
reforms of the legal and institutional framework designed and implemented by the
Hungarian government in curbing discriminatory practices (the reduction in the gender
wage gap is almost identical to the reduction in its unexplained component). In other
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gender wage gap appears to be more limited.
Ukraine gives us an interesting opportunity to learn more about the evolution of the
gender wage gap in a country where policy makers have started actively pursuing
gender equalization. Obviously, given the short period of time passed from the imple-
mentation of gender equalizing policies and the multitude of changes taking place in
the period under analysis, I do not expect to be able to precisely quantify the impact of
government efforts on the gender wage gap. However, exploiting the fact that the intro-
duction of new legislations and policies to favor gender equality is likely to affect differ-
ent segments of the labor market asymmetrically, it might still be possible to identify a
relationship between these efforts and the evolutions observed in these different
segments. For example, one would expect the policies to be more effective in reducing
wage discrimination as well as horizontal and vertical discrimination in the public
sector, where – by definition – the control of policy makers is the strongest. The effect-
iveness of the policies should then decrease as one moves to the private sector and have
the lowest impact among the informally employed.3. Ukraine in the period 2003–2007: the economy, the Orange Revolution
and the new legal provisions for gender equality in the Ukrainian labor
market
3.1 A growing economy
For the Ukrainian economy the period of 2003–2007 was one of strong growth
(higher than average growth in CEE and CIS countries) stimulated by increasing
exports and internal demand. The growth rate of real GDP remained between 7.3 and
12.1 percent over the whole period, with the exception of the year 2005 in which
international steel prices plummeted, pulling down Ukrainian GDP growth to 2.7 per-
cent.9 In the same period, Ukrainian prices grew faster than in neighbouring coun-
tries. Starting from a 5.2 percent level in 2003,10 CPI grew at rates between 9 and
12.8 percent in the remaining years. We can thus say that the Ukrainian economy in
the period 2003–2007 was booming. This also affected the labor market, where the
unemployment rate decreased steadily from 9.1 percent in 2003 to 6.4 percent in
2007.11 In this period the private sector became the largest source of employment as
the relative size of the public sector shrunk. Growth translated only to a limited
extent into higher nominal and real wages, peaking in 2005 and reaching their mini-
mum level in 2007.3.2 A changing political scenario
The main political event of the period was the “Orange Revolution”, a peaceful mass
protest that led to the victory of Ukraine’s reformist forces. The Orange Revolution
started in the closing months of 2004 and continued until the beginning of 2005. The
years that followed saw an intensification of structural reforms and the adoption and
implementation of new pieces of legislation. Among the main structural reforms
introduced since year 2000, the IMF (2008a) lists reforms in areas related to business,
trade, energy and the government’s budget. Most of these took place in the period
2003–2007.12
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was that of gender equality. (Kupets 2010) cites a number of important milestones that
shaped gender equality policy in Ukraine, all in the period 2003–2007 (or, more
precisely, after 2005):
– Presidential Decree No. 1135 on Improvement of Activity of National and Regional
Executive Power Bodies on Ensuring Equal Rights and Opportunities of Men and
Women (signed on 26 July 2005);
– The Law of Ukraine on Ensuring Equal Rights and Opportunities for Women and
Men (in force since 1 January 2006);
– The State Programme for Ensuring Gender Equality in Ukrainian Society up to
2010 (approved by the Decree of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine on 27
December 2006);
– The Decree of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine on Preparation and Conduction
of the Year of Gender Equality (adopted on 16 May 2007);
– The Inter Agency Council on Family, Gender Equality, Demographic Development
and Human
Trafficking Prevention was formed and its main tasks and duties were specified
according to the Decree of the Cabinet of Ministers on 5 September 2007.
Following this proliferation of laws and related legal acts, the issue of gender started
being incorporated into the main systems of the country – at the national as well as at
the regional level - with the main responsibility for gender strategy development and
implementation being attributed to the Ministry for Family, Youth and Sports.
The picture that emerges here is that of a country in the process of change on many
different levels, all affecting directly or indirectly the labor markets. I expect these
changes to have affected labor market dynamics, particularly the relative position of
men and women.4. Data and data issues
The Orange Revolution (late November 2004 to January 2005) marked a clear turning
point in Ukrainian public policies. The availability of the Ukrainian Longitudinal
Monitoring Survey (ULMS) dataset covering the years (2003–2007) – before and after the
Orange Revolution – gives us the chance to monitor the way in which the gender wage
gap evolved in this period characterized by substantial economic and political changes.
The Ukrainian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (ULMS) is a nationally representative,
household panel survey established to monitor Ukraine’s path of transition from Com-
munism to a market-oriented economy. The target of the household survey is the
working age population, spanning people aged between 15 and 70. The ULMS was
undertaken for the first time in the spring of 2003, when it included around 4,000
households and approximately 8,500 individuals. The second wave was administered
between May and July 2004. Sample sizes fell to 3,397 and 7,200 respectively. The third
wave was collected in the second half of 2007. The number of surveyed households fell
to about 3,100 and the number of individuals to approximately 6,800. The data used in
this paper are those from the individual questionnaires for the two reference weeks in
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form of the employment relationship, monthly incomes, hours worked and individual
and job characteristics.
Thanks to the structure of the questionnaire, it is possible to distinguish salaried
workers from self-employed workers and also formally employed (individuals who are
working as employees on the basis of a written contract) from informally employed
(without a written contract). It should be emphasized that in the analysis I will be
looking at informal employment relationships (job not registered in either informal or
formal sector firms) rather than employment in the informal sector (individuals
working in informal sector firms).
Looking at informal employment relationships is important, as shown in a recent
paper (Pignatti 2011) exploring the existence of a possible link between labor market
segmentation and the gender earnings gap in Ukraine in the years 2003 and 2004. The
separate analysis of the formal and informal segments of the Ukrainian labor market
led to distinctively different conclusions. While the gender pay gap in the formal sector
appeared to be characterized by a substantial unexplained component, the gender pay
gap in the informal segment of the labor market turned out to be fully explained by
differences in individual and job characteristics. For this reason, in the following
section, the analysis will be conducted not only at the aggregate level, contrasting pub-
lic and private sector dynamics (as in the Ganguli and Terrell paper) but will also
explore the evolution of the gender wage gap for formal and informal employees. As
Ganguli and Terrell did – and differently from (Pignatti 2011) - I decided to exclude
the self-employed from the analysis and to focus on salaried workers.
In this paper, the gender wage gap will be estimated using real hourly wages. This is
preferable to using monthly wages, as the number of hours worked by women is usu-
ally lower than that of men and this alone justifies part of the wage gap when we look
at monthly salaries. Once more, this is possible thanks to the detail of the data
collected in the reference week section of the questionnaire. Salaried employees are
asked in both reference weeks to give their last monthly net salary in Hryvnia and
to indicate the number of hours they worked in each of the previous 4 working
weeks. To calculate hourly wages I took monthly wages and divided them by the
number of hours obtained adding up the hours worked in the 4 weeks times 1.1
(to correct for the number of weeks in one month).13 Hourly wages for 2007 were
then transformed in real wages in 2003 terms dividing them by the change in CPI
between 2003 and 2007.14
Like in all CIS countries, salaried workers in Ukraine have been confronted with wage
arrears. This phenomenon had already reduced substantially in 2003 and had almost
disappeared in 2007. However, because in 2003 a substantial fraction of workers still
reported to have received less or more than the contractual wage in the last month
preceding the reference week, in order to take into account the effects of these
“disturbances” I included in the wage regressions dummy variables for both cases.
An issue one has to be aware of when analyzing wages is that of selection. Unless
missing data about monthly wages, hours of work or control variables and missing
observations (due to attrition) are distributed approximately uniformly across the sam-
ple, the conclusions of this paper will be valid only for the observations in our sample
and therefore one should be cautious when extending them to the whole population.
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After a brief analysis of the descriptive statistics characterizing the 2003 and 2007
samples, I will proceed to the analysis of the raw gap at the mean and across the distri-
bution. First of all, I will estimate the size of the raw wage gap, not only at the aggre-
gate level but also along the public/private (as Ganguli and Terrell did in 2005) and
formal/informal dimensions. The raw wage gap at the mean will be estimated using
ordinary least squares while the raw wage gap across the distribution will be estimated
with quantile regressions.15 I will then decompose the gender wage differentials (and
their changes)16 to see whether they can be explained by differences in observable
characteristics or depend instead upon some unexplained factor.
In a situation characterized by horizontal or vertical segregation (as it was in Former
Soviet Union), the type of occupation and the sector in which women are working
might help explaining the size of the gender wage gap. To test whether this is still the
case in Ukraine, all the decompositions will be performed using three different
specifications of the wage equations:
 Specification 1 - Base equation: including only age, age squared, educational
dummies, tenure, tenure squared together with dummies for wages temporarily above
and below contractual wages and regional dummies;
 Specification 2- adding job variables to specification 1: part time, type of occupation
(from managerial to elementary positions);
 Specification 3 – introducing sectoral dummies: industry, services, agriculture,
hunting and fishing and public administration.
5.1 Decomposition at the mean
The decomposition of the wage gap at the mean is performed using both “standard”
(Oaxaca 1973, Blinder 1973) and the “weighted” version of the Oaxaca-Blinder decom-
position suggested by Oaxaca and Ransom (1994). Oaxaca and Ransom suggest using
as benchmark for the decomposition of the wage gap at the mean a weighted average
of the coefficient vectors for the two groups, rather than taking the coefficients of one
or the other as reference group.17 The weights in this case are being calculated as
suggested by Neumark (1988).18 In both cases the wage gap is decomposed in two
parts: an explained part due to differences in characteristics (or endowments) and an
unexplained part (“discriminatory component”) due to differences in coefficients.
The decomposition of the changes in the wage gap between 2003 and 2007 is done
using the methodology proposed by Juhn et al. (1991). In this case it is the change in
the wage gap across two periods to be decomposed into an explained and an unex-
plained part. Of course in this case the decomposition is more complex, having to take
into account the evolution of the gap. Given two points in time, the formula for the
change in the outcome differential can be written as:
ΔWG ¼ WG2 WG1 ¼ D2 dX2; β^2
 
 D1 dX1; β^1
 h i
þ dr2s2  dr1s1½ 
Where dX and dX are the differences in endowments and β^ and β^ are the2 1 1 2
coefficients in the two periods. The product of rt and st is the vector of residuals that in
this case has been rewritten as the product of the standardized residuals in a given
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(st, with t=1 or 2). The first expression corresponds to the “predicted gap” (dE) and the
second part is the change in the “residual gap” (dU). These two parts can be further
decomposed obtaining:
dE ¼ DOQ dX2  dX1ð Þ; β^2
h i
þ DOP dX1; β^2  β^1
 h i
þ DOQOP dX2  dX1ð Þ; β^2  β^1
 h i
dU ¼ DUQ dr2  dr1ð Þ; s1½  þ DUP dr1; s2  s1ð Þ½  þ DUQUP dr2  dr1ð Þ; s2  s1ð Þ½ 
The three terms of the decomposition of the “predicted gap” are respectively: the part explained by changes in the group differences in “observed quantities”
 the part explained by changes in “observed prices”
 an adjustment term accounting for the interaction effect due to the simultaneous
change of prices and quantities.
The three terms of the decomposition of the “residual gap” are respectively:
 the part explained by changes in the group differences in residual positions
(resulting from changes in “unobserved quantities” and in discrimination given a
certain residual inequality)
 the part explained by changes in residual inequality (changes in “unobserved prices”
affecting the distribution of residuals for given unobserved quantities)
 an adjustment term accounting for the interaction effect.5.2 Decomposition across the distribution
Studies decomposing the wage gap across the distribution usually follow the
simulation-based methodology presented by Machado and Mata in their 2005 paper. In
this case, however, to decompose the wage gap across the distributions I will adopt the
approach suggested by (Melly 2005 and 2006). In his 2005 paper Melly introduced a
new estimator of distribution functions in the presence of covariates that does not rely
on simulation and it is, therefore, much faster to implement. In addition, in his 2006
paper Melly shows that his estimator is numerically equivalent to the Machado and
Mata (2005) decomposition when the number of simulations goes to infinity.19
The semiparametric approach suggested by Melly starts by estimating a number
quantile regressions uniformly distributed between 0 and 1 in order to estimate the
conditional wage distribution.20 Results obtained have then to be integrated in order
to obtain the unconditional distribution. This approach is particularly interesting as it
does not require imposing any distributional assumptions and uses the information
contained in the regressors, allowing the covariates to influence the entire conditional
distribution. Even more interesting is the possibility, associated with this procedure, to
estimate counterfactual unconditional distributions.
Taking the distribution of characteristics for women and the coefficients estimated
using the observations for men it is then possible to estimate the counterfactual distri-
bution we would observe if they had men’s output function (if women’s characteristics
were remunerated in the same way as men’s) and vice versa.
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wage distributions at deciles 1 to 9 (10th, 20th, 30th, 40th, 50th, 60th, 70th, 80th and 90th
percentiles). For each of these deciles I decompose the observed difference between the
two wage distributions into an explained and an unexplained part.
The formula for the decomposition of the wage gap at each decile (θ) is the following:
Qθ ln wf










θ Xf ; β^
f θ
 








Where:m is for males, f is for females, θ indicates the decile, X indicates the vector of ex-
planatory variables and β^ the vector of estimated coefficients. The expression between
the first brackets (to the left) gives us the part of the gap explained by differences in
characteristics, while the second expression tells us instead which part is due to
differences in remuneration of characteristics for men and women. Here the reference
group is, obviously, men.
This, however, is just a “static” counterfactual analysis, that is, the analysis of what
would have been the counterfactual wage gap, where women remunerated as men in a
given period. It is possible to use the same methodology to conduct also a counterfac-
tual analysis of the changes in the gender wage gap, calculating several alternative
counterfactuals to identify the factors explaining the gap dynamics between 2003 and
2007. In this work I will calculate 4 counterfactual gaps, two for women and two for
men, following the same strategy adopted by Dohmen et al. (2008):
1. Women:
a the gap that would have been observed in 2007 if women had the same













a the gap that would have been observed in 2007 if men had the same characteristics






b the gap that would have been observed in 2007 if the returns to men’s
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6.1 Descriptive analysis
In Table 1 21 we can observe that real hourly wages of Ukrainian workers have
increased substantially from 2003 to 2007. This is consistent with fact that in the period
under analysis the Ukrainian economy was booming - maybe even overheating – driven
by steel exports and by a strong and increasing internal demand.
On average, in our dataset, hourly wages have more than doubled both for men and
for women. The only exception to this finding can be found by looking at the infor-
mally employed women (Table 2). In this case the hourly wages, despite havingTable 1 All employed
2003 2007 2003 2007

















Age 15-24 9.3 14.8 12.2 21.1 1.44 1.86 0.78 3.12 4.38 0.71
Age 25-39 36.3 34.9 42.3 39.2 1.53 2.30 0.67 3.30 4.78 0.69
Age 40-54 46.5 37.7 37.6 28.0 1.47 2.04 0.72 3.48 4.11 0.85
Age 55-64 6.7 10.3 6.9 9.6 1.28 1.70 0.76 3.23 3.64 0.89
Age 65+ 1.2 2.3 1.1 2.1 1.16 1.86 0.62 2.40 2.63 0.91
Elementary and
less
12.5 22.8 9.0 15.0 1.21 1.83 0.66 2.98 3.83 0.78
Secondary 62.0 59.3 66.0 67.2 1.37 1.96 0.70 2.90 4.18 0.69
University and
higher
25.5 17.9 24.9 17.8 1.91 2.74 0.70 4.70 5.54 0.85
Managers 1.7 3.0 3.0 5.1 2.09 5.05 0.41 5.01 5.93 0.84




21.5 11.2 21.0 8.2 1.33 2.35 0.57 3.21 4.36 0.74









0.9 2.3 0.4 1.6 1.26 1.40 0.90 2.28 3.20 0.71
Craft and related
trades workers





2.7 11.4 2.8 13.8 1.66 2.08 0.80 3.22 3.95 0.82
Elementary
occupations
18.7 18.7 20.2 17.8 1.13 1.52 0.75 2.30 3.12 0.74
Agriculture 4.2 8.3 4.2 7.4 1.18 1.01 1.17 2.94 2.66 1.11
Industry 19.6 34.5 17.1 30.6 1.60 2.35 0.68 3.34 4.93 0.68
Services 72.0 54.1 74.9 58.6 1.45 2.06 0.70 3.33 4.31 0.77
Public
administration
4.1 3.1 3.8 3.4 1.69 2.20 0.77 3.63 4.22 0.86
Total 1638 1370 1441 1364 1.48 2.07 0.71 3.33 4.36 0.76
Source: ULMS – Own calculations.
Table 2 Employed in an informal employment relationship
2003 2007 2003 2007

















Age 15-24 18.7 35.7 30.5 36.4 1.32 1.79 0.74 2.86 3.32 0.86
Age 25-39 50.6 38.4 40.8 39.0 1.35 1.93 0.70 2.46 4.42 0.56
Age 40-54 29.2 22.6 22.0 21.7 1.34 1.19 1.13 2.34 3.82 0.61
Age 55-64 1.5 1.2 5.0 2.1 0.74 2.21 0.34 2.26 1.83 1.24
Age 65+ 0.0 2.2 1.6 0.8 - 0.65 - 1.27 1.02 1.24
Elementary and
less
26.6 31.0 16.4 20.6 1.44 1.78 0.81 2.80 2.99 0.93
Secondary 62.7 57.2 72.7 77.1 1.29 1.74 0.74 2.41 4.08 0.59
University and
higher
10.7 11.8 10.9 2.4 1.34 1.25 1.07 2.86 2.44 1.17
Managers 0.0 2.2 0.0 0.0 - 2.62 - - - -




1.7 3.0 4.0 3.1 1.64 2.23 0.74 2.77 2.96 0.94









0.8 1.9 1.4 0.0 1.75 0.97 1.79 2.15 - -
Craft and related
trades workers





0.0 7.7 1.6 9.1 - 2.68 - 2.71 2.20 1.23
Elementary
Occupations
30.4 38.2 18.2 41.9 1.18 1.54 0.76 2.00 3.44 0.58
Agriculture 7.2 10.7 3.5 6.9 0.89 0.98 0.91 2.80 2.57 1.09
Industry 10.3 14.4 11.7 17.7 1.42 1.89 0.75 3.10 3.70 0.84
Services 82.5 74.9 84.8 75.3 1.35 1.73 0.78 2.44 3.96 0.62
Public
administration
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 - - - - - -
Total 90 75 119 140 1.33 1.68 0.79 2.52 3.81 0.66
Source: ULMS – Own calculation
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http://www.izajold.com/content/1/1/7increased substantially (1.9 times) from 2003 to 2007 have grown significantly less than
they did for men (2.3 times). This is reflected in the ratio of female-to-male hourly
wages which decreased from 0.79 to 0.66 passing from being the highest in 2003 to
being the smallest in 2007. In all other cases the ratio of female-to-male wages has
increased.
The evolution has not been uniform across the sample. For example, younger women
(age 15–24), who were over represented among the informally employed, saw their
situation deteriorate while things remained stable or substantially improved for other
age groups, especially for women aged 40 and above. The situation also improved for
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http://www.izajold.com/content/1/1/7the less educated and for those with university education or higher. One possible
explanation for the relative improvement in the condition of less educated women
could be the flight of the lowest earners from the labor market, resulting ceteris paribus
in an increase in their average wage with respect to men with the same level of educa-
tion. However, this does not seem the case if we look at Table 3. The average hourly
wage of women remaining informal was significantly lower than that of the leavers.
Surprisingly enough, the relative status of the less educated women improved regard-
less of the type of contractual arrangement they had (formal or informal) or of the part
of the economy in which they worked (public or private).22
Looking at the occupational variables, two clear trends emerge. At the top of the clas-
sification, in the highly skilled positions (managers and professionals) the condition of
women improved dramatically regardless of where they worked, with the exception of
the informal sector where the number of women in those positions was negligible. For
female managers, the wage ratio more than doubled from 2003 to 2007. For
professionals, the change was less dramatic, but took the wage ratio close to unity.
Instead, for service workers and shop and market sales workers, skilled workers in agri-
culture, forestry and fishing and craft and trade related workers the wage ratio went
down significantly.
At the sectoral level the agricultural sector stands out. Women in agriculture,
hunting and fishing seem to have earned on average more than men both in 2003 and
2004. The situation in the industrial sector shows no sign of change (apart from theTable 3 Summary statistics:employed in 2003 who remained informal
Informal % of employees
within each category
Mean hourly wages
Females Males Females Males
Age 15-24 29.7 45.0 1.05 2.63
Age 25-39 46.0 41.6 1.00 1.71
Age 40-54 24.3 13.3 0.84 1.29
Age 55-64 0.0 0.0 - -
Age 65+ 0.0 0.0 - -
Elementary and less 28.1 48.2 1.19 2.21
Secondary 62.8 51.8 0.94 1.89
University and higher 9.1 0.0 0.95 -
Managers 0.0 0.0 - -
Professionals 0.0 0.0 - -
Technicians and associate professionals 0.0 10.9 - 2.27
Clerks 0.0 0.0 - -
Service workers and shop and market sales 54.2 9.8 1.10 1.42
Skilled agricultural, forestry, and fishery workers 0.0 0.0 - -
Craft and related trades workers 0.0 33.0 - 2.00
Plant and machine operators and assemblers 0.0 4.5 - 2.84
Elementary Occupations 45.8 41.8 0.75 2.06
Agriculture 0.0 6.3 - 0.70
Industry 8.2 23.6 1.99 2.09
Services 91.8 70.0 0.91 2.15
Observations 10 13 10 13
Source: ULMS – Own calculations.
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http://www.izajold.com/content/1/1/7shrinking of the size of the sector itself ) while the wage ratio increased in both the ser-
vice and public administration sectors.6.2 The raw wage gaps
I start my econometric analysis by estimating the raw wage gap at the mean and across
the distribution. In Table 4 I report the results of the simple OLS and quantile regressions
performed on pooled samples of men and women with the dummy variable female as the
only explanatory variables. As announced in the methodological part (section 5), the
regressions are performed:
– on the sample including all employees
– on the samples including, respectively, employees in formal and informal working
relationships
– on the samples including, respectively, employees in the private and public sectors.
The log wage gap for the sample including all employees is fairly stable, oscillating
from −0.26 to −0.24. Looking at quantile estimates the overall (small) reduction appears
to be the result of an increase in the gap at the very bottom of the distribution (deciles
1 to 3) and of a reduction (with the exception of the coefficient at the median) from
the 4th decile up. It seems that women at the bottom of the distribution started losing
ground from the relatively “less disadvantaged” position in which they were in 2003. In
their work, (Ganguli and Terrell 2005) suggested that this “wage floor” at the bottom of
the distribution could be related to an increase in the minimum wage, becoming more
binding in 2003 with respect to the past years they observed. If the minimum wage was
indeed responsible for the relative improvement of the wage gap for women at the
bottom of the distribution, the increase of the wage gap in 2007, after a period of strong
growth might not be necessarily a negative sign (at least in absolute terms). As it can be
seen from Figure 1, the distribution of wages shifted noticeably to the right between 2003
and 2007, with more people (men and women) earning more than the minimum wage.23
Therefore, the increase of the gap at the bottom of the distribution is not incompatible
with the possibility of an improvement (in absolute terms) of women’s conditions, even
though this improvement would have been higher had gender inequality not increased.
The apparent stability of the raw gap between 2003 and 2007 also seems to hide very
different dynamics characterizing specific parts of the economy. For example, while the
wage gap has decreased in the case of the employed in the public sector (−0.059), it
appears to have increased in the private sector, especially in the case of informal em-
ployment relationships (+0.191). These data underline a dramatic change in the struc-
ture of the gender wage gap distribution in the economy in the period under analysis,
with several forces at work and different parts of the labor market being affected asym-
metrically. The analysis of the raw gap at different quantiles strengthens this message.
Gaps at the bottom of the distribution have been increasing under all specifications,
while at the top of the distribution they have been flattening out or decreasing in most
cases. Once more, things evolve differently in the case of the informally employed, for
whom the gender gap shoots as high as 0.63 and 0.693 in the last two deciles from
much lower levels. These patterns can easily be seen looking at Figure 2.
Table 4 Raw gender wage gap by decile and at the mean
d1 d2 d3 d4 d5 d6 d7 d8 d9 OLS
2003 -0.049 -0.150 -0.181 -0.300 -0.335 -0.339 -0.301 -0.340 -0.307 -0.256
All (-0.034) (0.025)*** (0.028)*** (0.041)*** (0.019)*** (0.015)*** (0.020)*** (0.020)*** (0.044)*** (0.021)***
2007 -0.118 -0.220 -0.297 -0.288 -0.329 -0.241 -0.274 -0.272 -0.288 -0.239
(0.021)*** (0.030)*** (0.030)*** (0.000)*** (0.033)*** (0.010)*** (0.041)*** (0.026)*** (0.039)*** (0.022)***
Formal 2003 -0.038 -0.144 -0.185 -0.311 -0.336 -0.342 -0.303 -0.331 -0.303 -0.259
(-0.026) (0.016)*** (0.029)*** (0.042)*** (0.020)*** (0.015)*** (0.020)*** (0.024)*** (0.044)*** (0.021)***
2007 -0.136 -0.223 -0.272 -0.288 -0.357 -0.259 -0.264 -0.223 -0.251 -0.231
(0.020)*** (0.034)*** (0.030)*** (0.017)*** (0.027)*** (0.028)*** (0.042)*** (0.027)*** (0.045)*** (0.023)***
Informal 2003 -0.093 -0.015 -0.069 -0.231 -0.319 -0.276 -0.223 -0.308 -0.144 -0.162
(-0.21) (-0.146) (-0.144) (-0.189) (0.160)** (0.100)*** (0.124)* (0.123)** -0.238 (0.095)*
2007 -0.041 -0.174 -0.300 -0.336 -0.363 -0.386 -0.357 -0.629 -0.693 -0.353
(-0.122) (-0.106) (0.108)*** (0.111)*** (0.117)*** (0.071)*** (0.079)*** (0.113)*** (0.160)*** (0.082)***
Private 2003 -0.068 -0.134 -0.249 -0.223 -0.272 -0.292 -0.273 -0.223 -0.262 -0.220
(-0.071) (0.052)** (0.075)*** (0.034)*** (0.051)*** (0.073)*** (0.060)*** (0.058)*** (0.089)*** (0.043)***
2007 -0.073 -0.223 -0.272 -0.288 -0.332 -0.243 -0.273 -0.366 -0.288 -0.258
(-0.047) (0.052)*** (0.057)*** (0.022)*** (0.041)*** (0.039)*** (0.048)*** (0.046)*** (0.078)*** (0.032)***
Public 2003 -0.049 -0.162 -0.190 -0.340 -0.370 -0.342 -0.316 -0.357 -0.354 -0.276
(0.029)* (0.022)*** (0.029)*** (0.036)*** (0.033)*** (0.025)*** (0.017)*** (0.031)*** (0.051)*** (0.024)***
2007 -0.077 -0.232 -0.284 -0.288 -0.341 -0.274 -0.288 -0.185 -0.062 -0.217
(0.032)** (0.042)*** (0.028)*** (0.016)*** (0.047)*** (0.029)*** (0.063)*** (0.054)*** -0.078 (0.032)***
Source: ULMS. Wage regressions having as only explanatory variable the dummy female.
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Figure 2 Gender wage gap by decile: Aggregate, by sector and type of contractual arrangement –
years 2003 and 2007.
Pignatti IZA Journal of Labor & Development 2012, 1:7 Page 16 of 44
http://www.izajold.com/content/1/1/7
Pignatti IZA Journal of Labor & Development 2012, 1:7 Page 17 of 44
http://www.izajold.com/content/1/1/76.3 Decomposition at the mean: Oaxaca-Blinder and Oaxaca-Ransom decompositions
The gender wage gap in all subsamples and in all specification is substantial (between
.20 and .35 if we exclude the case of the informally employed in 2003).
If we look at the first columns of Tables 5 and 6 (corresponding to the basic model
for year 2003) we can see that the existing gap depends overwhelmingly from the unex-
plained component. The explained component, when it is significant, has the effect of
“closing” part of the gap. This tells us that in 2003 Ukrainian women had better observ-
able characteristics than men. Without this, the wage gap would have been even larger.
Adding occupational and sectoral variables allows us to test for the potential exist-
ence of segregation both at the horizontal and at the vertical level. The evidence, once
more, is consistent across subsamples. The inclusion of job and industry variables
provokes a change in the sign of the explained component. Now the explained
components justify part of the wage gap, suggesting that women’s collocation across
and within sectors penalizes them and more than offsets their better individual
characteristics. Interestingly, the Oaxaca and Ransom decomposition shows that in
2003, segregation into less paid occupations and sectors seems to explain most of the
(smaller) wage gap (at least when the coefficient is significant) in the informal sector,
while this is not true in the other cases.24 This finding, however, vanishes when I
perform the standard Oaxaca-Blinder composition and keep men as reference group.
In 2007, after the Orange revolution and a period characterized by numerous economic
and political changes, the picture appears somehow different. As we have seen in the ana-
lysis of the raw gap, on average the wage gap is stable or slightly decreasing, as it is the
relative importance of the unexplained component. However, it remains true that not all
parts of the labor market evolve in the same way. For example, while in the public sector
and among the formally employed (which include also public employees) the gap
decreases, in the private sector and – even more – among the informally employed, we
see it increasing. Overall, women’s individual characteristics contribute to the contain-
ment of the gender gap. Also in 2007, when we move from the first (basic) specification
to the ones including occupational and sectoral variable, a bigger part of the gender gap is
explained. It seems, therefore, that despite the efforts to achieve gender equality, in 2007
horizontal and vertical segregation still existed in the Ukrainian labor market.6.4 Decomposition of the change in the gender wage gap at the mean
Tables 7 and 8 report estimates of the decomposition of the change in the gender wage
gap between 2003 and 2007, performed using the methodology presented by Juhn et al.
(1991). The two tables differ simply in terms of sets of reference coefficients and
reference residual distributions. In Table 7 I report the results obtained taking as
reference the coefficient and residuals obtained pooling both groups together. In Table 8
I use as reference coefficients and residual distributions those estimated for men.
The changes in the overall gender wage gap and in particular the reduction of the
gender wage gap in the formal sector are driven by the changes in the public sector
that, despite a substantial reduction in relative size, in 2007 still employed slightly less
than 50% of the total employees in the economy (down from more than 60% in 2003).
In the private sector, however, things look different, with the gender gap increasing,
particularly among the informally employed.
Table 5 Decomposition at the mean: Oaxaca and Ransom
2003 2007
Specification 1 Specification 2 Specification 3 Specification 1 Specification 2 Specification 3
All
Difference -0.256 -0.257 -0.264 -0.238 -0.236 -0.234
(0.023)*** (0.023)*** (0.023)*** (0.024)*** (0.024)*** (0.025)***
Decomposition
- Explained 0.047 -0.042 -0.061 0.048 -0.027 -0.038
(0.008)*** (0.013)*** (0.014)*** (0.009)*** (0.015)* (0.016)**
- Unexplained -0.303 -0.215 -0.203 -0.286 -0.210 -0.196
(0.021) *** (0.019)*** (0.019)*** (0.022)*** (0.019)*** (0.020)***
Formal
Difference -0.260 -0.261 -0.266 -0.232 -0.233 -0.234
(0.023)*** (0.023)*** (0.023)*** (0.025)*** (0.025)*** (0.025)***
Decomposition
- Explained 0.046 0.038 -0.056 0.047 -0.022 -0.028
(0.009)*** (0.013)*** (0.014)*** (0.010) (0.015) (0.016)*
- Unexplained -0.306 -0.223 -0.210 -0.279 -0.211 -0.206
(0.021)*** (0.020)*** (0.019)*** (0.023)*** (0.020)*** (0.020)***
Informal
Difference -0.162 -0.159 -0.166 -0.330 -0.309 -0.290
(0.100) (0.100) (0.105) (0.080)*** (0.076)*** (0.079)***
Decomposition
- Explained 0.015 -0.117 -0.106 -0.046 -0.197 -0.251
(0.044) (0.065)* (0.081) (0.034) (0.056)*** (0.061)***
- Unexplained -0.177 -0.042 -0.059 -0.284 -0.112 -0.039


















Table 5 Decomposition at the mean: Oaxaca and Ransom (Continued)
Public
Difference -0.277 -0.277 -0.278 -0.225 -0.224 -0.222
(0.027)*** (0.027)*** (0.027)*** (0.035)*** (0.035)*** (0.035)***
Decomposition
- Explained 0.050 -0.049 -0.070 0.059 -0.023 -0.032
(0.010)*** (0.016)*** (0.017)*** (0.015)*** (0.023) (0.023)
- Unexplained -0.327 -0.228 -0.208 -0.284 -0.201 -0.190
(0.025)*** (0.023)*** (0.022)*** (0.032)*** (0.028)*** (0.028)***
Private
Difference -0.219 -0.223 -0.225 -0.249 -0.251 -0.247
(0.044)*** (0.044)*** (0.044)*** (0.034)*** (0.034)*** (0.034)***
Decomposition
- Explained 0.035 -0.069 -0.075 0.032 -0.040 -0.055
(0.017)** (0.026)*** (0.028)*** (0.013)** (0.021)* (0.022)**
- Unexplained -0.254 -0.153 -0.150 -0.281 -0.211 -0.192
(0.041)*** (0.036)*** (0.036)*** (0.032)*** (0.027)*** (0.027)***
Source: ULMS.
Specification 1 - Base equation: including only age, age squared, educational dummies, tenure, tenure squared together with dummies for wages temporarily above and below contractual wages and
regional dummies;
Specification 2- adding to specification 1 job variables: part time, type of occupation (from managerial to elementary positions);
Specification 3 – introducing sectoral dummies: industry, services, agriculture, hunting and fishing and public administration.


















Table 6 Decomposition at the mean: Oaxaca and Blinder
2003 2007
Specification 1 Specification 2 Specification 3 Specification 1 Specification 2 Specification 3
All
Difference -0.256 -0.257 -0.264 -0.238 -0.236 -0.234
(0.021)*** (0.021)*** (0.021)*** (0.022)*** (0.022)*** (0.023)***
Decomposition
- Explained 0.041 -0.020 -0.037 0.064 0.057 0.022
(0.016)*** (0.031) (0.034) (0.018)*** (0.037) (0.043)
- Unexplained -0.298 -0.237 -0.227 -0.302 -0.293 -0.256
(0.024)*** (0.036)*** (0.039)*** (0.026)*** (0.040)*** (0.046)***
Formal
Difference -0.260 -0.261 -0.266 -0.232 -0.233 -0.234
(0.021)*** (0.021)*** (0.022)*** (0.023)*** (0.023)*** (0.023)***
Decomposition
- Explained 0.049 -0.031 -0.044 0.076 0.089 0.055
(0.017)*** (0.032) (0.035) (0.020)*** (0.039)** (0.043)
- Unexplained -0.308 -0.230 -0.222 -0.308 -0.322 -0.289
(0.025)*** (0.037)*** (0.039)*** (0.027)*** (0.043)*** (0.046)***
Informal
Difference -0.162 -0.159 -0.166 -0.330 -0.309 -0.290
(0.102)*** (0.106) (0.112) (0.079)*** (0.076)*** (0.081)***
Decomposition
- Explained 0.055 -0.004 -0.268 0.112 0.070 0.179
(0.153) (0.219) (0.304) (0.104) (0.193) (0.218)
- Unexplained -0.217 -0.156 0.102 -0.441 -0.379 -0.469


















Table 6 Decomposition at the mean: Oaxaca and Blinder (Continued)
Public
Difference -0.277 -0.277 -0.278 -0.225 -0.224 -0.222
(0.025)*** (0.025)*** (0.025)*** (0.032)*** (0.033)*** (0.033)***
Decomposition
- Explained 0.056 -0.038 -0.040 0.034 0.076 0.084
(0.018)*** (0.037) (0.039) (0.034) (0.064) (0.066)
- Unexplained -0.333 -0.239 -0.237 -0.259 -0.301 -0.307
(0.028)*** (0.043)*** (0.044)*** (0.045)*** (0.070)*** (0.072)***
Private
Difference -0.219 -0.223 -0.225 -0.249 -0.251 -0.247
(0.042)*** (0.043)*** (0.043)*** (0.032)*** (0.032)*** (0.032)***
Decomposition
- Explained 0.041 0.102 -0.006 0.018 0.029 0.000
(0.037) (0.072) (0.084) (0.024) (0.052) (0.062)
- Unexplained -0.260 -0.324 -0.219 -0.267 -0.279 -0.247
(0.051)*** (0.078)*** (0.089)** (0.036)*** (0.057)*** (0.065)***
Source: ULMS.
Specification 1 - Base equation: including only age, age squared, educational dummies, tenure, tenure squared together with dummies for wages temporarily above and below contractual wages and
regional dummies;
Specification 2- adding to specification 1 job variables: part time, type of occupation (from managerial to elementary positions);
Specification 3 – introducing sectoral dummies: industry, services, agriculture, hunting and fishing and public administration.


















Table 7 Decomposition of the change in the gender wage gap at the mean
(reference estimates – pooled samples over both groups)
Specification 1 Specification 2 Specification 3





Explained -0.001 0.007 -0.010 0.001 -0.013 0.026 -0.041 0.002 -0.019 0.031 -0.047 -0.003





Explained 0.000 0.003 -0.003 -0.001 -0.016 0.016 -0.035 0.004 -0.014 0.020 -0.021 -0.013





Explained 0.047 0.032 -0.190 0.205 0.124 0.106 -0.148 0.165 0.164 0.264 -0.122 0.022





Explained -0.006 -0.002 0.010 -0.015 -0.022 0.029 -0.033 -0.018 -0.039 0.018 -0.042 -0.014





Explained 0.001 0.027 -0.036 0.010 -0.022 0.003 -0.048 0.022 -0.011 0.057 -0.050 -0.017
Unexplained 0.036 0.067 -0.013 -0.017 0.058 0.081 -0.011 -0.012 0.041 0.057 -0.011 -0.005
Source: ULMS.
Specification 1 - Base equation: including only age, age squared, educational dummies, tenure, tenure squared together
with dummies for wages temporarily above and below contractual wages and regional dummies;
Specification 2- adding to specification 1 job variables: part time, type of occupation (from managerial to
elementary positions);
Specification 3 – introducing sectoral dummies: industry, services, agriculture, hunting and fishing and
public administration.
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the gender gap can be explained by the change in observables when we control just for
individual characteristics and regional dummies. The only exception is constituted by
the informally employed, where the change in observables explains about 25% of the
change in the gap, against an overall average of only about 7%. Women’s observable
characteristics appear to have remained more or less stable in the public sector and
among formal employees and to have deteriorated in the private sector, particularly
among informal employees.
Of the 93% of the change in the overall gap unexplained by observables, most (about
80%) is due to an improvement in women’s relative position in the residual wage distri-
bution and only marginally to a narrowing of the distribution itself. Similar conclusions
can be drawn looking at the decomposition of the change in the public sector and for
the formally employed.
The increase in the gap we observe in the private sector and among the informally
employed appears to be due to the fact that the narrowing of the distribution of
Table 8 Decomposition of the change in the gender wage gap at the mean
(reference estimates – male coefficients and residual distributions)
Specification 1 Specification 2 Specification 3





Explained 0.007 0.008 -0.004 0.004 -0.013 0.019 -0.036 0.003 -0.018 0.032 -0.035 -0.014





Explained 0.009 0.004 0.006 0.000 -0.001 0.009 -0.015 0.005 0.009 0.022 0.002 -0.016





Explained 0.024 0.018 -0.256 0.262 0.077 0.142 -0.197 0.132 0.172 0.380 -0.093 -0.115





Explained -0.033 -0.002 0.008 -0.039 -0.046 0.019 -0.018 -0.047 -0.054 0.021 -0.024 -0.051





Explained -0.002 0.021 -0.042 0.019 -0.075 -0.006 -0.110 0.040 -0.051 0.070 -0.094 -0.027
Unexplained 0.040 0.077 -0.018 -0.019 0.111 0.149 -0.009 -0.029 0.081 0.113 -0.012 -0.020
Source: ULMS.
Specification 1 - Base equation: including only age, age squared, educational dummies, tenure, tenure squared together
with dummies for wages temporarily above and below contractual wages and regional dummies;
Specification 2- adding to specification 1 job variables: part time, type of occupation (from managerial to
elementary positions);
Specification 3 – introducing sectoral dummies: industry, services, agriculture, hunting and fishing and
public administration.
Pignatti IZA Journal of Labor & Development 2012, 1:7 Page 23 of 44
http://www.izajold.com/content/1/1/7earnings (associated with the remuneration of attributes) has been more than offset by
a deterioration of the position of women in the residual distribution (that could be due
to a worsening of unobservable characteristics or to an increased discrimination). In a
situation in which average wages have been increasing substantially, it looks like
women in the private sector and especially among the informally employed have lost
terrain. In the public sector, on the other hand, the positive effect of the narrowing of
the distribution of earnings has been strengthened by an improvement of the position
of women in the residual distribution (that could be due to the improvement of unob-
servable characteristics or to a reduction in discrimination).
The same patterns are observed when I use as reference coefficients and residual
distributions estimated for men (Table 8) with the exception of the public sector, where
most of the reduction in the wage gap is now explained by changes in the explained
components. Considerations about changes in the distribution of earnings and of
residuals for women working in the public sectors, however, do not change.
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2 and 3) increases the explained component of the wage gap relative to the unexplained
one in almost all cases. The impacts, however, are significantly different across sectors
and/or types of contractual arrangement. In particular, occupational and sectoral
variables help explaining almost all of the (large) increase of the wage gap among the
informal employed and at the same time most of the reduction of the wage gap in the
public sector. As occupation and sectoral variables allow us to test for the existence of
vertical and/or horizontal segregation, this result seems to imply that in the public
sector women have managed both to progress in terms of occupation and to switch to
(or to remain in) economic activities that benefited mostly from growth, while exactly
the opposite seems to have happened to the informally employed. Women in the pri-
vate sector (which include both formally employed and informally employed) appear to
be somehow in between, with some improvement in terms of occupational outcomes
more than offset by the worsening of their position in the residual distribution.
The change in the gap appears to derive from the net effect of several forces, pushing
sometimes in different directions. On one hand, the relative change in observables
(including occupation and economic sectors) seems to penalize women in the informal
sector and to work in their favor in the public one. On the other hand, the improve-
ment in the remuneration of observables seems to work towards a reduction of the gap
everywhere. Where the second effect prevails, or where the two effects work together
like in the public sector, the gap shrinks. Where it does not, as in the private sector
and for the informally employed, it expands. Again, in these last two cases, the deterior-
ation of the position of women in the residual distribution (which does not happen in
the other cases) also continues playing a role. Interestingly enough, in the informal
sector this component gets much smaller as I introduce occupational and sectoral
variables among the explanatory variables. This indicates that a substantial part of the
apparent deterioration in the position of women in the residual distribution in the case
of the informally employed is due to increased segregation of women in occupations
(such as service workers and shop and market salespersons) and sectors (such as
services) that did not benefit from growth as much as those where men were most
present.
This picture is compatible with a situation in which the introduction and enforce-
ment of gender legislation is starting to affect the labor market, beginning with public
employees and (to a lesser extent) the formally employed but having more difficulties
in“reaching” the informal segment of the labor market.6.5 Decomposition of the gap across the distribution by year25
As we have seen, the gender wage gap varies across the distribution and its pattern
changed in different ways in different parts of the labor market during the period
2003–2007.
In 2003 the gender gap at the bottom of the distribution was overall relatively small.
As we have already discussed, (Ganguli and Terrell 2005) suggested this result was the
evidence of a “wage floor” for women and attributed this result to the role of minimum
wages. As we move up through the wage distribution, the gap increases, to reach a
maximum above the 4th decile, evidence compatible with the existence of, what in the
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the aggregate distribution of wages in 2003, hides some differences (across sectors and
contractual forms) and I am going to analyze them by looking – as in previous sections
– at three different specifications: one including exclusively individual characteristics
and regional dummies, the second one adding to the previous one occupational
variables and the last one including also sectoral variables. As the results of the second
and third specification are qualitatively very similar (the introduction of sectoral
variables just strengthens the results), I will report only the results relative to the first
and the last specifications.26
When I estimate the basic model (Tables 9 and 10), the decomposition of the wage
gap by decile shows that in all sectors the existing gap is not due to worse observable
characteristics of women. Indeed, the contrary is true. Age, tenure and educational
characteristics – when they turn out to be significant – contribute to the reduction of
the gap that otherwise would have been even larger. This is evident in all regressions
but the panel relative to the private sector employees, where only the difference in
coefficients is significant, indicating that in this sector women’s individual
characteristics are not significantly better (or worse) than men’s.
Overall, observables contribute to the reduction of the log wage gap by 0.05-0.07
points (that is, the wage gap is from 5 to 7 percentage points smaller than it would
have been otherwise). This is almost enough to offset the negative effect of coefficients
at the bottom deciles, while the same is not true as we go up in the distribution and
the size of the unexplained component grows.
In 2003, the private sector shows on average lower wage gaps than those observed in
the public sector across all the distribution, with the exception of the lowest decile.
Moreover, differently from what happens in the public sector (where the gap increases
as we move to the top of the distribution) the gap reaches the maximum towards the
median of the distribution, to decrease again as one gets close to the top. Therefore, in
the private sector I do not find strong evidence to support the existence of a “wage ceil-
ing” for women. At the very top (9th decile) women in the private sector are estimated
to get on average 21.4% less than men against those in the private sector 37.5% (at the
median the differences were respectively 30.4% and 35.2%).
When I add occupational and sectoral variables to the basic specification (Tables 11
and 12) differences in characteristics cease, in most cases, to contribute significantly to
the reduction of the gender wage gap. In the case of those employed in the private sec-
tor, this component actually starts contributing to the gap. This clearly indicates how
women tend to be disadvantaged, not only in terms of remuneration of their observed
characteristics but also by being segregated in occupations and economic sectors with
worse remuneration prospects.
From 2003 to 2007 things changed substantially.
Among the formally employed and the public employees, the wage gap increased at
the bottom of the distribution and decreased at the top, remaining stable at the central
deciles. The largest reduction in the gender gap took place in the public sector, due
both to an increase in the part explained by observed characteristics and to a decrease
in the unexplained part. Once more, the contribution of observable characteristics
appears to be positive if I consider only individual characteristics (specification 1) and
turns to insignificant when I include occupational and sectoral variables, with the
Table 9 Decomposition of the gender wage gap by decile – Specification 1 (reference estimates – male coefficients and residual distributions)
All
2003
d1 d2 d3 d4 d5 d6 d7 d8 d9
Raw difference -0.022 -0.132 -0.228 -0.308 -0.339 -0.354 -0.339 -0.323 -0.328
(0.017)*** (0.012)*** (0.012)*** (0.014)*** (0.018)*** (0.017)*** (0.023)*** (0.023)*** (0.025)***
Characteristics 0.065 0.060 0.064 0.062 0.062 0.059 0.062 0.067 0.068
(0.028)* (0.024)** (0.024)*** (0.023)*** (0.023)*** (0.023)*** (0.023)*** (0.026)*** (0.034)**
Coefficients -0.087 -0.193 -0.291 -0.370 -0.402 -0.413 -0.401 -0.390 -0.397
(0.029)*** (0.023)*** (0.023)*** (0.022)*** (0.020)*** (0.020)*** (0.020)*** (0.022)*** (0.029)***
2007
Raw difference -0.103 -0.196 -0.261 -0.294 -0.315 -0.306 -0.283 -0.272 -0.209
(0.015)*** (0.015)*** (0.017)*** (0.015)*** (0.019)*** (0.021)*** (0.025)*** (0.029)*** (0.034)***
Characteristics 0.048 0.054 0.054 0.057 0.058 0.060 0.060 0.058 0.066
(0.026)* (0.024)** (0.023)*** (0.021)*** (0.018)*** (0.022)*** (0.023)*** (0.026)*** (0.039)**
Coefficients -0.151 -0.250 -0.315 -0.351 -0.373 -0.366 -0.342 -0.330 -0.275
(0.025)*** (0.023)*** (0.020)*** (0.019)*** (0.017)*** (0.018)*** (0.020)*** (0.021)*** (0.031)***
Formal
2003
d1 d2 d3 d4 d5 d6 d7 d8 d9
Raw difference -0.036 -0.147 -0.235 -0.309 -0.338 -0.352 -0.341 -0.327 -0.338
(0.016)** (0.012)*** (0.011)*** (0.014)*** (0.019)*** (0.019)*** (0.024)*** (0.024)*** (0.026)***
Characteristics 0.056 0.057 0.061 0.062 0.066 0.062 0.065 0.070 0.072
(0.023)** (0.021)*** (0.021)*** (0.020)*** (0.019)*** (0.019)*** (0.022)*** (0.026)*** (0.033)**
Coefficients -0.092 -0.203 -0.296 -0.371 -0.403 -0.414 -0.406 -0.397 -0.410


















Table 9 Decomposition of the gender wage gap by decile – Specification 1 (reference estimates – male coefficients and residual distributions) (Continued)
2007
d1 d2 d3 d4 d5 d6 d7 d8 d9
Raw difference -0.127 -0.219 -0.273 -0.306 -0.317 -0.297 -0.268 -0.245 -0.167
(0.014)*** (0.015)*** (0.018)*** (0.015)*** (0.020)*** (0.023)*** (0.025)*** (0.029)*** (0.034)***
Characteristics 0.038 0.047 0.049 0.053 0.050 0.056 0.051 0.054 0.075
(0.030) (0.024)** (0.025)** (0.026)** (0.023)** (0.026)** (0.026)** (0.026)** (0.037)**
Coefficients -0.165 -0.265 -0.322 -0.359 -0.367 -0.353 -0.320 -0.299 -0.243
(0.027)*** (0.023)*** (0.023)*** (0.022)*** (0.022)*** (0.023)*** (0.022)*** (0.021)*** (0.030)***
Source: ULMS.
Specification 1 - Base equation: including only age, age squared, educational dummies, tenure, tenure squared together with dummies for wages temporarily above and below contractual wages and
regional dummies;


















Table 10 Decomposition of the gender wage gap by decile – Specification 1 (reference estimates – male coefficients and residual distributions)
Private
2003 d1 d2 d3 d4 d5 d6 d7 d8 d9
Raw difference -0.063 -0.143 -0.235 -0.284 -0.304 -0.313 -0.272 -0.236 -0.214
(0.039) (0.027)*** (0.031)*** (0.031)*** (0.034)*** (0.038)*** (0.043)*** (0.042)*** (0.061)***
Characteristics 0.059 0.031 0.021 0.018 0.021 0.033 0.036 0.051 0.049
(0.047) (0.046) (0.042) (0.037) (0.035) (0.037) (0.039) (0.043) (0.065)
Coefficients -0.122 -0.175 -0.256 -0.302 -0.324 -0.345 -0.308 -0.287 -0.263
(0.047)*** (0.039)*** (0.041)*** (0.036)*** (0.030)*** (0.031)*** (0.033)*** (0.036)*** (0.048)***
2007
Raw difference -0.124 -0.195 -0.242 -0.285 -0.304 -0.306 -0.322 -0.328 -0.274
(0.027)*** (0.023)*** (0.025)*** (0.026)*** (0.028)*** (0.029)*** (0.030)*** (0.035)*** (0.051)***
Characteristics 0.042 0.038 0.042 0.046 0.047 0.053 0.049 0.043 0.032
(0.037) (0.038) (0.037) (0.036) (0.031) (0.034)* (0.035) (0.036) (0.045)
Coefficients -0.166 -0.233 -0.284 -0.331 -0.350 -0.358 -0.371 -0.371 -0.305
(0.035)*** (0.034)*** (0.034)*** (0.032)*** (0.031)*** (0.031)*** (0.031)*** (0.033)*** (0.045)***
Public
2003 d1 d2 d3 d4 d5 d6 d7 d8 d9
Raw difference -0.035 -0.148 -0.240 -0.314 -0.352 -0.370 -0.365 -0.356 -0.375
(0.015)** (0.011)*** (0.011)*** (0.014)*** (0.018)*** (0.017)*** (0.022)*** (0.025)*** (0.027)***
Characteristics 0.056 0.059 0.063 0.065 0.067 0.062 0.068 0.069 0.063
(0.035)* (0.026)** (0.028)** (0.028**) (0.026)** (0.025)** (0.029)*** (0.034)** (0.037)*
Coefficients -0.090 -0.207 -0.303 -0.379 -0.418 -0.433 -0.433 -0.425 -0.439
(0.032)*** (0.025)*** (0.028)*** (0.029)*** (0.027)*** (0.025)*** (0.027)*** (0.029)*** (0.039)***
2007 d1 d2 d3 d4 d5 d6 d7 d8 d9
Raw difference -0.116 -0.208 -0.259 -0.286 -0.319 -0.302 -0.268 -0.211 -0.136


















Table 10 Decomposition of the gender wage gap by decile – Specification 1 (reference estimates – male coefficients and residual distributions) (Continued)
Characteristics 0.038 0.045 0.060 0.071 0.069 0.072 0.080 0.082 0.129
(0.035) (0.034) (0.034)** (0.037)** (0.036)** (0.038)** (0.040)** (0.043)** (0.060)***
Coefficients -0.154 -0.253 -0.319 -0.357 -0.388 -0.374 -0.348 -0.292 -0.265
(0.032)*** (0.030)*** (0.029)*** (0.032)*** (0.034)*** (0.030)*** (0.034)*** (0.038)*** (0.047)***
Source: ULMS.
Specification 1 - Base equation: including only age, age squared, educational dummies, tenure, tenure squared together with dummies for wages temporarily above and below contractual wages and
regional dummies;


















Table 11 Decomposition of the gender wage gap by decile – Specification 3 (reference estimates – male coefficients and residual distributions)
All
2003
d1 d2 d3 d4 d5 d6 d7 d8 d9
Raw difference -0.048 -0.148 -0.226 -0.294 -0.333 -0.350 -0.334 -0.324 -0.331
(0.017)*** (0.011)*** (0.011)*** (0.014)*** (0.016)*** (0.017)*** (0.020)*** (0.019)*** (0.023)***
Characteristics 0.026 0.008 -0.015 -0.023 -0.016 -0.009 0.013 0.036 0.079
(0.026) (0.024) (0.027) (0.031) (0.030) (0.028) (0.029) (0.033)** (0.044)***
Coefficients -0.074 -0.156 -0.210 -0.272 -0.317 -0.341 -0.347 -0.359 -0.410
(0.028)*** (0.022)*** (0.022)*** (0.022)*** (0.018)*** (0.016)*** (0.015)*** (0.018)*** (0.027)***
2007 d1 d2 d3 d4 d5 d6 d7 d8 d9
Raw difference -0.115 -0.194 -0.242 -0.275 -0.299 -0.310 -0.307 -0.277 -0.212
(0.014)*** (0.013)*** (0.014)*** (0.013)*** (0.017)*** (0.020)*** (0.025)*** (0.029)*** (0.033)***
Characteristics 0.011 0.004 0.005 0.009 0.010 0.018 0.027 0.034 0.044
(0.030) (0.028) (0.028) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.033) (0.044)
Coefficients -0.127 -0.198 -0.247 -0.284 -0.309 -0.328 -0.334 -0.310 -0.256
(0.023)*** (0.022)*** (0.021)*** (0.019)*** (0.020)*** (0.019)*** (0.019)*** (0.021)*** (0.031)***
Formal
2003
d1 d2 d3 d4 d5 d6 d7 d8 d9
Raw difference -0.044 -0.147 -0.227 -0.296 -0.333 -0.350 -0.338 -0.326 -0.343
(0.017)** (0.012)*** (0.013)*** (0.015)*** (0.017)*** (0.018)*** (0.021)*** (0.020)*** (0.021)***
Characteristics 0.032 0.015 -0.005 -0.004 -0.002 -0.001 0.014 0.036 0.075
(0.027) (0.024) (0.026) (0.029) (0.030) (0.029) (0.031) (0.034) (0.043)**
Coefficients -0.076 -0.162 -0.222 -0.292 -0.331 -0.349 -0.352 -0.362 -0.418


















Table 11 Decomposition of the gender wage gap by decile – Specification 3 (reference estimates – male coefficients and residual distributions) (Continued)
2007
d1 d2 d3 d4 d5 d6 d7 d8 d9
Raw difference -0.141 -0.220 -0.252 -0.284 -0.306 -0.308 -0.297 -0.245 -0.175
(0.015)*** (0.015)*** (0.017)*** (0.017)*** (0.018)*** (0.020)*** (0.024)*** (0.030)*** (0.036)***
Characteristics -0.017 -0.012 0.001 0.009 0.011 0.021 0.032 0.040 0.057
(0.029) (0.028) (0.029) (0.028) (0.029) (0.030) (0.030)* (0.035)* (0.048)*
Coefficients -0.124 -0.208 -0.254 -0.293 -0.318 -0.329 -0.329 -0.285 -0.233
(0.024)*** (0.021)*** (0.020)*** (0.021)*** (0.021)*** (0.020)*** (0.019)*** (0.021)*** (0.034)***
Source: ULMS.
Specification 3 - Adding to specification 1 job variables and sectoral dummies: part time, type of occupation (from managerial to elementary positions), industry, services, agriculture, hunting and fishing and
public administration.


















Table 12 Decomposition of the gender wage gap by decile – Specification 3 (reference estimates – male coefficients and residual distributions)
Private
2003 d1 d2 d3 d4 d5 d6 d7 d8 d9
Raw difference -0.061 -0.169 -0.244 -0.282 -0.294 -0.316 -0.305 -0.265 -0.217
(0.038) (0.025)*** (0.030)*** (0.034)*** (0.039)*** (0.040)*** (0.043)*** (0.046)*** (0.064)***
Characteristics -0.013 -0.042 -0.076 -0.094 -0.070 -0.074 -0.082 -0.064 -0.048
(0.077) (0.064) (0.054)** (0.053)*** (0.051)** (0.049)** (0.048)** (0.049)* (0.060)
Coefficients -0.048 -0.127 -0.168 -0.188 -0.224 -0.242 -0.223 -0.201 -0.169
(0.046) (0.038)*** (0.038)*** (0.034)*** (0.031)*** (0.036)*** (0.036)*** (0.035)*** (0.044)***
2007 d1 d2 d3 d4 d5 d6 d7 d8 d9
Raw difference -0.147 -0.195 -0.237 -0.278 -0.295 -0.305 -0.317 -0.312 -0.283
(0.032)*** (0.029)*** (0.031)*** (0.030)*** (0.029)*** (0.028)*** (0.033)*** (0.037)*** (0.048)***
Characteristics -0.042 -0.031 -0.021 -0.004 0.009 0.018 0.023 0.031 0.019
(0.049) (0.041) (0.043) (0.041) (0.038) (0.038) (0.039) (0.043) (0.055)
Coefficients -0.105 -0.164 -0.216 -0.274 -0.304 -0.323 -0.340 -0.344 -0.302
(0.035)*** (0.032)*** (0.031)*** (0.025)*** (0.025)*** (0.027)*** (0.028)*** (0.030)*** (0.040)***
Public
2003 d1 d2 d3 d4 d5 d6 d7 d8 d9
Raw difference -0.032 -0.145 -0.222 -0.302 -0.347 -0.374 -0.378 -0.363 -0.378
(0.021) (0.015)*** (0.013)*** (0.015)*** (0.017)*** (0.020)*** (0.027)*** (0.027)*** (0.030)***
Characteristics 0.033 0.013 -0.019 -0.026 -0.017 -0.007 0.002 0.015 0.037
(0.035) (0.029) (0.034) (0.037) (0.033) (0.030) (0.033) (0.040) (0.053)
Coefficients -0.065 -0.159 -0.203 -0.275 -0.330 -0.366 -0.380 -0.377 -0.415
(0.032)** (0.024)*** (0.026)*** (0.025)*** (0.022)*** (0.021)*** (0.023)*** (0.026)*** (0.036)***
2007 d1 d2 d3 d4 d5 d6 d7 d8 d9
Raw difference -0.107 -0.183 -0.247 -0.273 -0.300 -0.314 -0.300 -0.220 -0.148


















Table 12 Decomposition of the gender wage gap by decile – Specification 3 (reference estimates – male coefficients and residual distributions) (Continued)
Characteristics 0.016 -0.008 -0.018 -0.016 -0.014 -0.009 0.002 0.016 0.080
(0.046) (0.046) (0.045) (0.044) (0.045) (0.048) (0.051) (0.059) (0.077)
Coefficients -0.123 -0.175 -0.229 -0.256 -0.285 -0.305 -0.302 -0.237 -0.228
(0.034)*** (0.033)*** (0.030)*** (0.030)*** (0.032)*** (0.031)*** (0.031)*** (0.034)*** (0.050)***
Source: ULMS.
Specification 3 - Adding to specification 1 job variables and sectoral dummies: part time, type of occupation (from managerial to elementary positions), industry, services, agriculture, hunting and fishing and
public administration.
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http://www.izajold.com/content/1/1/7exception of the top deciles for formal employees. Thus, part of the gender gap seems
still to be due, at least in part, to unfavorable observable job and sector characteristics.
The private sector seems to follow an opposite path with respect to the public one.
In this case the gender gap increases or at least does not decrease at any decile and this
seems to be mostly due to increasingly different remuneration of men’s and women’s
characteristics.
Overall, the reduction of the gap, driven by the reduction taking place mainly in the
public sector, seems to be due mostly to an improvement in women’s individual
characteristics relative to men’s and to a better remuneration of these characteristics
with only a limited improvement in occupational and sectoral positions. The combin-
ation of these effects seems to also result in the “weakening” of the “wage ceiling” at
the top of the distribution.6.6 Analysis of the change in the gender gap by decile in the period 2003–2007
In Tables 13 and 14 I conclude my analysis by performing the counterfactual analysis
of the change in the gender gap in the period 2003–2007 across the distribution,
presenting our results in a way comparable with (Ganguli and Terrell 2005) and
Dohmen, Lehmann and Zaiceva (2008). The purpose of this counterfactual analysis is
to discuss the possible reasons for the change in the gender gap across the distribution
by analyzing alternative scenarios. I will perform the analysis adopting the three different
specifications used in past sections and report the results relative to specifications 1 and 3.
As specified in the methodological section, I will calculate 4 counterfactual gaps, two
for women and two for men, following the same strategy adopted by Dohmen,
Lehmann and Zaiceva (2008).
Rows (a) in Tables 13 and 14 report the ratios between the actual gaps in 2007 and in
2003 while other rows report the ratios between counterfactual gaps and the actual
gaps in 2003. Values above 1 indicate that the gap has been increasing (or the counter-
factual gap would have been larger than the actual gap in 2003) while values below 1
indicate that the gap has been decreasing (or the counterfactual gap would have been
smaller than the actual gap in 2003) and negative values indicate a reversal of the wage
gap. As we have seen in previous analysis, in the period 2003–2007 the overall raw gap
increased at the bottom of the distribution and diminished at the top, driven by the
evolution of the wage gap in the public sector. At the same time, in the private sector
was observed a generalized increase of the gap across the distribution.
Moving to the counterfactual analysis, in Table 13 (basic specification) we see that if
women had been remunerated with the coefficients of 2007 but had the same distribution
of characteristics they had in 2003, the gap would have been almost unchanged (or slightly
higher) at the very bottom and near the median of the distribution, and would have been
smaller than in reality in all other parts of the distribution, especially at the very top, indi-
cating a relative improvement (or at least not a deterioration) in characteristics for
the first groups and a deterioration for the last one. This tells us that observable
characteristics for women at the bottom of the distribution improved over time contribut-
ing to a reduction in the observed wage gap, while the opposite happened at the top of
the distribution where the deterioration of individual characteristics somehow prevented
a larger reduction of the gap (given the remuneration of characteristics in 2007).
Table 13 Analysis of the change in the gender wage gap by decile in the period 2003-2007 – Specification 1
d1 d2 d3 d4 d5 d6 d7 d8 d9
All (a) Ratio gaps 2007/2003 2.408 1.467 1.641 0.960 0.982 0.711 0.910 0.800 0.938
Women Ratio counterfactual 1a/Actual gap 2003 2.418 1.308 1.439 0.976 0.934 0.892 0.930 0.794 0.648
Ratio counterfactual 1b/ Actual gap 2003 17.213 6.318 5.709 3.659 3.333 3.289 3.640 3.159 3.471
Men
Ratio counterfactual 2a/ Actual gap 2003 1.061 1.089 1.273 0.899 0.898 0.891 0.942 0.818 0.695
Ratio counterfactual 2b/ Actual gap 2003 -14.270 -4.049 -2.941 -1.618 -1.367 -1.342 -1.585 -1.414 -1.727
Formal (a) Ratio gaps 2007/2003 3.579 1.549 1.470 0.926 1.063 0.757 0.871 0.674 0.828
Women
Ratio counterfactual 1a/ Actual gap 2003 3.847 1.548 1.507 0.999 0.964 0.893 0.911 0.778 0.579
Ratio counterfactual 1b/ Actual gap 2003 22.695 6.748 5.693 3.572 3.345 3.256 3.597 3.201 3.442
Men
Ratio counterfactual 2a/ Actual gap 2003 2.393 1.295 1.321 0.914 0.908 0.858 0.891 0.758 0.576
Ratio counterfactual 2b/ Actual gap 2003 -18.153 -4.178 -2.906 -1.578 -1.403 -1.377 -1.624 -1.509 -1.802
Private (a) Ratio gaps 2007/2003 1.074 1.664 1.092 1.291 1.221 0.832 1.000 1.641 1.099
Women
Ratio counterfactual 1a/ Actual gap 2003 1.970 1.472 0.959 1.283 1.100 1.034 1.144 1.400 0.841
Ratio counterfactual 1b/ Actual gap 2003 12.666 7.147 4.142 4.841 4.040 3.805 3.993 4.707 3.984
Men
Ratio counterfactual 2a/ Actual gap 2003 0.105 0.886 0.888 1.236 1.150 1.040 1.055 1.253 0.775
Ratio counterfactual 2b/ Actual gap 2003 -10.799 -4.757 -2.192 -2.164 -1.701 -1.563 -1.762 -2.231 -2.244
Public (a) Ratio gaps 2007/2003 1.571 1.432 1.495 0.847 0.922 0.801 0.911 0.518 0.175
Women
Ratio counterfactual 1a/ Actual gap 2003 2.714 1.334 1.419 0.869 0.896 0.943 0.931 0.668 0.472


















Table 13 Analysis of the change in the gender wage gap by decile in the period 2003-2007 – Specification 1 (Continued)
Men
Ratio counterfactual 2a/ Actual gap 2003 3.699 1.483 1.496 0.915 0.910 0.972 1.000 0.892 0.764
Ratio counterfactual 2b/ Actual gap 2003 -13.377 -3.615 -2.760 -1.452 -1.254 -1.333 -1.516 -1.362 -1.475
Source: ULMS. Specification 1 - Base equation: including only age, age squared, educational dummies, tenure, tenure squared together with dummies for wages temporarily above and below contractual wages and
regional dummies.
a the actual gap is the coefficient on the female dummy in the quantile regressions without covariates.






































Table 14 Analysis of the change in the gender wage gap by decile in the period 2003-2007 – Specification 3
d1 d2 d3 d4 d5 d6 d7 d8 d9
All (a) Ratio gaps 2007/2003 2.408 1.467 1.641 0.960 0.982 0.711 0.910 0.800 0.938
Women
Ratio counterfactual 1a/Actual gap 2003 2.702 1.344 1.372 0.941 0.926 0.942 1.057 0.857 0.725
Ratio counterfactual 1b/ Actual gap 2003 17.452 6.139 5.471 3.464 3.181 3.164 3.512 3.072 3.410
Men
Ratio counterfactual 2a/ Actual gap 2003 1.777 1.307 1.329 0.925 0.900 0.934 1.061 0.855 0.779
Ratio counterfactual 2b/ Actual gap 2003 -15.123 -4.171 -3.138 -1.749 -1.488 -1.416 -1.599 -1.526 -1.871
Formal (a) Ratio gaps 2007/2003 3.579 1.549 1.470 0.926 1.063 0.757 0.871 0.674 0.828
Women
Ratio counterfactual 1a/ Actual gap 2003 4.337 1.567 1.377 0.906 0.902 0.883 0.952 0.720 0.514
Ratio counterfactual 1b/ Actual gap 2003 23.250 6.684 5.544 3.459 3.286 3.253 3.616 3.240 3.550
Men
Ratio counterfactual 2a/ Actual gap 2003 2.873 1.425 1.348 0.919 0.904 0.912 1.008 0.780 0.659
Ratio counterfactual 2b/ Actual gap 2003 -19.043 -4.284 -3.085 -1.706 -1.521 -1.466 -1.677 -1.670 -1.939
Private (a) Ratio gaps 2007/2003 1.074 1.664 1.092 1.291 1.221 0.832 1.000 1.641 1.099
Women
Ratio counterfactual 1a/ Actual gap 2003 1.301 1.036 0.802 1.119 1.037 0.990 1.070 1.239 0.844
Ratio counterfactual 1b/ Actual gap 2003 13.377 7.434 4.199 4.869 4.051 3.787 4.006 4.815 3.833
Men
Ratio counterfactual 2a/ Actual gap 2003 0.320 1.214 0.952 1.307 1.196 1.181 1.304 1.507 1.071
Ratio counterfactual 2b/ Actual gap 2003 -13.378 -5.679 -2.740 -2.747 -2.058 -1.804 -1.815 -2.317 -2.196
Public (a) Ratio gaps 2007/2003 1.571 1.432 1.495 0.847 0.922 0.801 0.911 0.518 0.175
Women
Ratio counterfactual 1a/ Actual gap 2003 2.872 1.304 1.427 0.885 0.867 0.976 1.037 0.716 0.492


















Table 14 Analysis of the change in the gender wage gap by decile in the period 2003-2007 – Specification 3 (Continued)
Men
Ratio counterfactual 2a/ Actual gap 2003 3.422 1.412 1.373 0.856 0.876 1.023 1.126 0.913 0.823
Ratio counterfactual 2b/ Actual gap 2003 -13.178 -3.470 -2.764 -1.410 -1.227 -1.289 -1.426 -1.354 -1.516
Source: ULMS. Specification 3 - Adding to specification 1 job variables and sectoral dummies: part time, type of occupation (from managerial to elementary positions), industry, services, agriculture, hunting and fishing
and public administration.
a the actual gap is the coefficient on the female dummy in the quantile regressions without covariates.
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http://www.izajold.com/content/1/1/7The changes that occurred in the period 2003–2007 are much more evident when we
consider the second counterfactual, assuming women had 2007 characteristics but were
remunerated according to 2003 prices. In this case the gap would explode across the
distribution, mostly at the bottom. The remuneration of women’s characteristics in
2003 was apparently much lower than in 2007, especially in the lower parts of the
distribution. This already gives an indication about another potential cause leading to a
reduction of the wage gap: the generalized increase in the remuneration of women’s
characteristics relative to men’s. This is consistent with the decomposition of the
changes at the mean, where the change in observed and unobserved prices was the
strongest component pushing towards a reduction of the gender wage gap.
When I perform the same counterfactual analysis for men I find that, having the
same characteristics in 2007 as they had in 2003, men would have been worse off and
the wage gap would have been smaller everywhere but in the proximity of the top of
the distribution. On the other hand, had men the same characteristics of 2007 with
2003 prices, the wage gap would be reversed and women would earn more than men.
This testifies the dramatic increase in remuneration of men’s and women’s individual
characteristics between 2003 and 2007.
The analysis at a more disaggregated level confirms these main impressions. Remu-
neration of men’s and women’s characteristics increased substantially in the period
2003–2007 in most parts of the Ukrainian labor market. In the same period, men’s
observable characteristics seem to have improved with respect to 2003 relative to
women’s, more so at the top. This is reflected by the generalized tendency to lower
counterfactual gaps when I attribute to men 2003 characteristics at 2007 prices.
The public sector stands out as it is the only one in which women’s characteristics
across the distribution and especially at the top appears to have improved from 2003 to
2007, therefore contributing to the reduction of the wage gap. Another interesting re-
sult characterizing the public sector is that, attributing to men 2003 characteristics
while maintaining 2007 prices the gap increases substantially, especially at the bottom
and at the very top of the distribution, indicating a deterioration in men’s observable
characteristics from 2003 to 2007. This phenomenon could be justified by the move-
ment of men from the public sector to the booming private sector in search for better
remuneration and career opportunities. Indeed, when we look at the simple probit
regressions predicting the probability to move from the public to the private sector
(Table 15) we see that men are much more likely to move, especially if they are very
experienced. Data show that almost 40% of men working in the public sector 2003 were
working in the private sector in 2007 while only about 20% of women did the same.
This disproportionate movement of men to the private sector might have been
encouraged by the stricter enforcement of gender-equalizing legislation in the public
sector or simply by the increased opportunities in the private sector. In any case,
considering that the most likely movers are those with higher tenure, these results
confirm how the substantial reduction in the wage gap in the public sector in the
period 2003–2007 is due to the combined effect of the deterioration in the attributes
of men working in that sector and of a more equitable remuneration of women’s
characteristics.
The counterfactual analysis performed using the less parsimonious results (Table 14)
leads exactly to the identification of the same patterns.
Table 15 Probit regressions – probability to move from the public to the private sector
in the period 2003-2007





University and higher −0.106 −0.112
(0.110) (0.150)






Number of children with age below 18 0.035 0.029
(0.045) (0.060)











Source: ULMS Robust standard errors in parentheses.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
Default categories are: Female, Elementary and less, Not married, Kyiv City.
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http://www.izajold.com/content/1/1/7Summarizing, the counterfactual analysis confirms the findings I discussed in the pre-
vious sections. In the period 2003–2007 a number of forces were at work. These forces
not only have dramatically increased the remuneration of individual characteristics in
general, but have contributed narrowing the distance between the remuneration of the
same characteristics for men and women, especially at the top of the distribution. This
appears to be the factor that, most of all, has contributed to the reduction in the gender
wage gap, despite the relative deterioration of women’s observable characteristics at the
top of the distribution (outside the public sector) and the persistence of vertical and
horizontal segregation.7. Conclusions
In this paper I have analyzed the evolution of the gender wage gap in Ukraine during
the years 2003–2007.
In the period under analysis women’s individual characteristics have been deteriorat-
ing relative to men’s in the private sector of the economy. This deterioration took place
mostly at the top of the distribution, pushing towards an enlargement of the gender
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http://www.izajold.com/content/1/1/7wage gap. Fortunately, at the same time (possibly also thanks to the efforts of the
government to reduce discrimination in the labor market) the differences between the
remuneration of observable characteristics for men and women shrunk. These two
effects were at work simultaneously, pulling in two opposite directions and leading to
the overall stability (or possibly a slight reduction) of the gender wage gap over the
period under analysis.
This aggregate result hides very different outcomes in the public sector, where the
gap decreased thanks to the improvement in women’s characteristics and to the reduc-
tion in differences of remuneration, and in the private sector, where the gap increased
(especially among the informally employed).
Another factor preventing a larger reduction in the gender wage gap seems to have
been the segregation of women in certain occupations and in certain sectors. Because
of segregation, women – contrary to men – seem not to have always been able to reap
fully the benefit of strong economic growth. This is evident by looking at the change in
the contribution of observable characteristics to the gender wage gap when occupa-
tional and sectoral variables are introduced (from positive to insignificant or from insig-
nificant to negative).
These results indicate that efforts to introduce and enforce pro-gender equality
measures have not been sufficient to eliminate women’s segregation in the labor mar-
ket, even though they seem to have led to its reduction in the public sector. This
underlines the existing difficulties in changing deeply rooted attitudes concerning the
types of occupations and sectors of activity perceived as “suitable” for women. Never-
theless, some reasons for optimism emerge. For example, when I decompose the
change in the gender wage gap at the mean, changes in occupations and the sector of
employment account for more than half of the reduction in the wage gap in the public
sector and contributes to limit its increase (to a more limited extent) in the private
sector. As enforcing pro-gender equality measures is more difficult in absence of writ-
ten and registered contracts, it is unsurprising that this effect is not present among the
informally employed, where most of the increase in the gap is indeed explained by
changes in occupational and sectoral variables. It would seem that, starting from the
public sector, horizontal and vertical segregation has starting being tackled, but there is
still a long way to go.
On the other hand, enforcing equal remuneration of identical characteristics seems
to have been relatively easier, especially at the top of the wage distribution, where com-
petitive forces were very likely working in the same direction, with employers compet-
ing for the most skilled individuals of both genders.
To conclude, the condition of working women in Ukraine certainly improved, both
in absolute and relative terms in the period 2003–2007. It is very plausible that at least
part of this improvement is due to the efforts of the Ukrainian government to design
and enforce policies to promote gender equality in the labor market. However, from
this work it appears how the “quest for gender equality” in Ukraine is far from
terminated and its successful conclusion will require a continued effort by future
governments in this direction, particularly focusing on vertical and horizontal segrega-
tion, which appears to still be pervasive, especially in the private sector, even as the
remuneration of individual characteristics seems to converge. Tackling this source of
inequality might require a greater emphasis on well-structured policies to change the
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http://www.izajold.com/content/1/1/7deeply rooted perceptions of gender “roles” and “functions” in th7e labor market, rather
than simple attempts to ensure “equal pay”. More efforts should also be made to assure
that gender legislation reaches the informal segment of the labor market, where the
gender wage gap has been increasing the most.
Designing such policies will certainly require a substantial effort but this seems to be
a crucial step to ensure greater gender equality in the Ukrainian labor market and better
development perspectives for the Ukrainian economy.
Endnotes
1Among them: the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimin-
ation against Women, the ILO Equal Remuneration Convention, 1951 (No. 100), the
Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention, 1958 (No.111) and the
Workers with Family Responsibilities Convention, 1981 (No. 156). For a more compre-
hensive list, see (Kupets 2010)
2They compared the log wage gaps for Ukraine - respectively 0.4, 0.41 and 0.34 for
1986, 1991 and 2003 - with the log wage gaps estimated in the comparative paper written
by (Blau and Kahn 2003) analyzing 21 countries – ranging from 0.14 (for Slovenia) to 0.48
(for Switzerland) and with an average value of 0.28
3Among them: Presidential Decree No. 1135 on Improvement of Activity of National
and Regional Executive Power Bodies in Ensuring Equal Rights and Opportunities of
Men and Women (signed on 26 July 2005); Law of Ukraine On Ensuring Equal Rights
and Opportunities to Women and Men (in force since 1 January 2006); The State
Programme for Ensuring Gender Equality in Ukrainian Society up to 2010 (approved
by the Decree of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine on 27 December 2006). For a
more comprehensive list, see (Kupets 2010).
4At the beginning of 2010, Viktor Yanukovych was elected president of Ukraine. In
October of the same year, the Constitutional Court of Ukraine http://www.ccu.gov.ua/
en/index overturned the 2004 constitutional amendments, restoring the power of the
president of the republic at the expense of the parliament. This was seen and described
by many international and national commentators as “the end of the Orange revolution
5See (Standing 1989, 1999). More recently, (ILO 2012) and the (World Bank 2012)
report the persistence of gender earning gaps, lower participation rates of women to
the labor force, segregation of women in certain economic activities and a higher likeli-
hood for women to be in vulnerable employment
6Occupational segregation, while undesirable in itself, in some case led to the improve-
ment of women’s relative conditions during the transition process. This happened in cases
in which they were segregated in specific sectors of the economy (for example the service
sector) that boomed after the collapse of the planned economy. See Orazem and
Vodopivec’s (1995) explanation for the improvement of women’s relative wages in Slovenia.
7Probably the most famous example of this effect is the case of East Germany, (Hunt
2002), where 40% of the 10% point increase of female wages with respect to male wages
is explained by the withdrawal of low wage earners from employment.
8Brainerd described these outcomes as a consequence of reforms. However, due to
the limited length of the time span covered by the data, one might have some concerns
about the capacity of capturing the true impact of the reforms on the labor markets.
This is especially true in the case of Ukraine, as the main reforms happening in the first
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http://www.izajold.com/content/1/1/7part of the 1990s took place in 1994, the year that Brainerd defines as post-reform. It is
hardly arguable that the reforms might have had the time to fully take effect.
9Sources: IMF country reports (2008a, 2008b, 2009)
10Consumer prices, period averages. Sources: IMF country reports (2008a, 2008b, 2009)
11ILO definition. IMF country reports (2008a, 2008b, 2009)
12Among them: the elimination of tax preferences (2004-2005), the review and amend-
ment of business regulations (2005-2006) and the reduction of import tariffs (2005)
13In a few cases the number of monthly hours declared was unrealistically high or
the monthly wage excessively low. In order to minimize the extent of potential meas-
urement errors I set a conservative rule that excluded from the sample individuals
whose hourly wage was below one half of the hourly minimum wage obtained dividing
the monthly minimum wage by the maximum number of hour worked in a month
allowed in the sample (330).
14Source: the State Statistics Service of Ukraine.
15Log hourly wages will be our dependent variable and the dummy variable female
(with value 1 if the individual is female and zero if the individual is male) will be our
only explanatory variable. With this specification, a negative coefficient will indicate
lower wages for women
16Unfortunately, due to data limitations, decompositions of the gender wage
differentials across the distribution cannot be performed for the informally employed.
It will still be performed, however, for the complete sample, for the public and private
sectors and for the formally employed.
17The “traditional” Blinder and Oaxaca (Oaxaca 1973, Blinder 1973) decomposition
can be seen as a special case of this decomposition, in which to one of the two groups’
coefficients is attributed a weight of one while to the other is attributed a weight of
zero. Neumark (1988) suggests fitting a pooled model to derive the counterfactual
coefficient vector
18These decompositions are performed using STATA routines developed by Benn
Jann (2008).
19For a more complete description of the estimator and its statistical properties, see:
(Chernozhukov, V., Fernandez-Val, I. and Melly 2009).
20For this purpose, the procedure written by Melly (rqdeco) used in this paper sets
the default number of quantile regressions to be estimated to 100. Melly suggests that
the default value should be appropriate for a wide range of applications. After a number
of tests for the sensitivity of the results to change in the number of regressions –
results where, anyway, quite stable – I decided to the number of regressions to 250.
21As the main patterns are identical across the sample with the exception of the
informally employed we report only the descriptive statistics for the overall sample
(Table 1) and for the informally employed (Table 2).
22Also in the other cases it is true than women with elementary education staying in
the same sector and/or retaining the same contractual arrangement show a lower
hourly wage than those who leave.
23This is confirmed if we look at the ratio between the average monthly wage and the
minimum wage in 2003 and 2007 for women. In this period the ratio increased from
1.3 to 1.9 indicating that the minimum wage became less and less binding.
24This is consistent with the findings of (Pignatti 2011)
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25The informally employed are excluded from this analysis due to data constraints
that have not allowed implementing the decomposition techniques.
26Results relative to the second specification are available upon request.
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